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The present paper analyzes a general class of ﬁrst-price all-pay auctions where
two players have diﬀerent "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start
advantage over his/her opponent. Equilibria are characterized for the complete
information setting and for the case where there is incomplete asymmetrical in-
formation. In particular, the handicapped player is uncertain about the size of
the opponent’s advantage.
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INTRODUCTION
In all-pay auctions, players must pay for their bids whether or not they win.
In other words, participation involves a resource commitment which is not condi-
tional on the event of winning, but is certain from the beginning. This description
ﬁts a large number of circumstances where competition between economic agents
requires making an irreversible investment before its results are observed. After
the seminal contributions by Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1993
and 1996), all-pay auctions have been widely studied and applied to several ﬁelds,
in economics ranging from rent-seeking activities (Tullock (1980); Becker (1983);
Hillman and Riley (1989)) to redistributive politics (Sahuguet and Persico (2006)),
from competition for patents (Fudenberg et al. (1983)) and for monopoly positions
(Ellingsen (1991)), to waiting in line (Clark and Riis (1998)), sales (Varian (1980))
and ﬁrm decisions over R&D investments (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980))1. The
present paper contributes to this debate, analyzing an issue which has received
growing attention in recent years: the case of asymmetrical players (see Siegel
(2009)).
A ﬁrst-price all-pay auction is analyzed where each player has his/her own
valuation of the prize and also his/her own "bidding technology". Identical invest-
ments thus deﬁne diﬀerent bids. This is due to asymmetries in money marginal
productivity and to a ﬁxed head start advantage awarded to a favored player.
Adding this element has some relevant eﬀects. If, indeed, it is possible to account
for diﬀerences in productivity rescaling players’ prize values, as proven by Baye
et al. (1996), the head start advantage requires a redeﬁnition of the equilibrium
strategies.
Studying a setting with a favored player is of some interest because in many
real world circumstances there are incumbency advantages. Moreover, it allows
another fairly common situation to be considered, where asymmetries involve the
distribution of information. Usually, the size of the advantage of an incumbent is
uncertain for potential entrants.
The main result of the paper is the characterization of an equilibrium for an
auction where there is asymmetrical incomplete information and the handicapped
player does not know the size of the head start advantage of his/her opponent.
The present setting is novel to the literature which only considers uncertainty over
money marginal productivity (see Moldovanu and Sela (2001)) but not over the
1See Konrad (2007) for an exhaustive review of the literature on contests and their applica-
tions.
1size of the head start advantage.
The equilibrium with complete information is also characterized allowing for
diﬀerent valuation of the auctioned object by the players. In this sense the model
is a generalization of Konrad (2002) which deﬁnes the equilibrium for the complete
information setting when the players have the same prize value. Furthermore it
complements Siegel (2009) which deﬁnes players’ payoﬀs when there is complete
information but does not characterize the equilibrium strategies.
There are several circumstances where contest rules require that players are
treated diﬀerently and the applications of the present analysis are potentially
large. This is the case for instance in criminal law, where the "in dubio pro reo"
principle applies. Bernardo et al. (2000) study this problem in a litigation game
where costly evidence presented by two agents is weighed unequally by the court.
In addition, incumbency is often an issue, as pointed out by Clark and Riis (2000)
who consider the case of a government contract awarded to those who succeed in
bribing a corrupt oﬃcial. In this setting ﬁrms have private information over the
value of winning and bribe marginal productivities are diﬀerent. Konrad (2002)
also considers contests where asymmetries are due to productivity and head start
advantage, and analyzes incentives to invest when property rights are absent.
A rather diﬀerent setting where asymmetries matter are elections. The strate-
gic equivalence between a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction and the problem of two can-
didates competing in an election on the basis of redistributive politics was ﬁrst
established by Sahuguet and Persico (2006). Competition with asymmetrical par-
ties and diﬀerent productivity of redistributive politics is studied by Kovenock and
Roberson (2008). The case of a head start advantage available to one candidate
is considered by Magnani (2010).
Analyzing the eﬀects of incomplete information provides useful insights for
many of the applications listed above where assuming that the handicapped player
does not know the size of the advantage of his/her opponent is realistic.
The paper has the following structure. An equilibrium for an all-pay auction
with asymmetrical players and complete information is characterized in Section
3.2. In Section 3.3, equilibria for the incomplete information setting are studied.
Section 3.4 duly concludes.
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COMPLETE INFORMATION
Consider a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction with complete information, where two risk-
neutral players, 1 and 2, compete, and assume, without loss of generality, that
Player 1 has a head start advantage α > 0. Every bid x2 by Player 2 is equivalent
to a bid x1 = x2 − α by Player 1. Money marginal productivity is the same for
both bidders but rescaling the prize values and the size of the advantage easily
allows accounting for diﬀerences in that1. Player i’s prize value is Vi > 0 (i = 1,2).
In the case of a tie, each player has the same probability of winning.
Diﬀerent equilibria emerge depending on the comparison between V2 and α,
which is crucial for Player 2’s participation in the auction.
Proposition 2.0.1 If V2 < α, in the unique equilibrium, Player 1 and Player 2
bid 0 with probability 1. Player 1’s payoﬀ amounts to V1 while Player 2 gets 0.
Proof. Any strictly positive bid smaller than α has a nil probability of win-
ning and gives Player 2 a strictly negative payoﬀ. However, any x2 ≥ α requires
Player 2 to pay a sum that exceeds his/her prize value and is a dominated action.
Bidding x2 = 0 is a dominant strategy for Player 2, who obtains a nil payoﬀ.
Since Player 2 does not submit positive bids, Player 1 always wins. Any
strictly positive oﬀer does not increase the probability of winning, but decreases
his/her expected payoﬀ. Hence bidding 0 with probability 1 is a dominant strategy
and gives a payoﬀ equal to V1.
The head start advantage represents a ﬁxed participation cost for Player 2
who decides not to bid if it exceeds his/her prize value.
If V2 ≥ α, Player 2 participates in the auction and only mixed strategy equi-
libria survive; this is a well known result for the standard all-pay auction and is
easily extended to the present setting. The comparison between V2 and V1 + α
deﬁnes the unique equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 2.0.2 If V2 ≥ α and V2 ≤ V1 + α hold, a unique equilibrium exists







if x1 = 0
if x1 > 0
￿
.
The expected payoﬀ amounts to V1 + α − V2 ≥ 0.
1This is proven by Baye et al. (1996) in a model with no head start advantage; their results
though are straightforwardly extended to the present setting.









if x2 = 0
if x2 > α
￿
.
He/She gets a nil expected payoﬀ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If prize values are diﬀerent, each player has a diﬀerent reach. Using Siegel’s
deﬁnition (2009) a player’s reach is the highest bid which gives a positive payoﬀ
if he/she wins with certainty. In the previous case Player 1 bids up to V1 which
is also his/her reach. This quantity exceeds Player 2’s prize value, net of the
participation cost represented by the opponent’s head start advantage, V2 − α
which deﬁnes his/her reach.
Therefore as in the standard all-pay auction Player 2 submits positive bids
with probability less than 1. This allows him/her to compete on equal terms with
the opponent when he/she actively participates in the auction. The size of the
atom in 0 is increasing in the ratio between the player’s reaches V2−α
V1 , and equals
1 if V2 = α.
The atom in Player 2’s equilibrium distribution provides Player 1 with the
incentive to reduce his/her expenditures by bidding 0 with some positive proba-
bility. Indeed, if both submit the same bid, the favored player wins because of
the head start advantage. The size of the atom in 0 depends on the relative size
of Player 1’s advantage compared to Player 2’s prize value and it is increasing in
α and decreasing in V2.
Consider now the case where V2 > V1 + α.
Proposition 2.0.3 If V2 > V1 + α, there is a unique equilibrium where Player 1








if x1 = 0
if x1 > 0
￿
.
He/She gets a nil expected payoﬀ.





The expected payoﬀ is V2 − α − V1 > 0
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2.
Player 1 bids 0 with positive probability because his/her reach is less than
that of the opponent. Since he/she does not pay any participation cost, the size
of the atom in 0 is increasing in the ratio V1
V2. The complete information setting
payoﬀs reproduce the results by Siegel (2009).
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INCOMPLETE ASYMMETRICAL INFORMATION
3.1 Uncertainty over the Existence of a Head-Start Advantage
Consider the situation where Player 2 is uncertain about the auctioneer in-
creasing the opponent’s bid while Player 1 observes his/her move. Let λ be the
probability that this happens. In this setting there are in facts two types of Player
1: one who has the advantage and one who doesn’t. Denote with F α
1 (x1) and
F0
1 (x1) Player 1’s equilibrium strategies respectively for the case where he/she
has the head start advantage and for the case where he/she has not. Players’
payoﬀs are deﬁned as follows:
E [U1(x1,F2(α + x
α































λ · V2 · F
α
1 (x2 − α) + (1 − λ)V2 · F
0
1 (x2) − x2 = p2
This implies that pα
1 ≥ p0
1 since F2(α + xα
1) ≥ F2(x0
1).
Diﬀerent equilibria emerge depending either from the size of the head start
advantage or from the probability that the advantage is actually awarded.
In a ﬁrst class of equilibria α > V2 holds and the size of the advantage exceeds
any bid possibly submitted by Player 2. As a consequence he/she never wins when
the advantage is awarded. In this case a unique equilibrium exists for the game
where Player 1 does not actively participate in the auction if he/she has the head
start advantage
A second circumstance entails α ≤ V2. When this happens Player 1 always
participate in the auction if he/she has the advantage. Multiple equilibria emerge
when λ > V1+α
V2 . If the probability that the opponent is favoured by the auctioneer
is high, Player 2 adopts a strategy that discourages the active participation of
Player 1 when he/she has no advantage. Another possible equilibrium entails
instead the active participation of Player 1 in both states of the world.
Consider initially the ﬁrst circumstance. A preliminary result is worth men-
tioning.
Lemma 3.1.1 If α > V2 holds, bidding 0 with probability 1 is a dominant strategy
for Player 1 when he/she has the head start advantage.
5Proof. Analogous to that of Proposition 3.1.
In equilibrium pα









= (1 − λ)V2 · F
0
1 (x2) − x2 = p2
Player 1’s expected payoﬀ when he/she has not the head start advantage is deﬁned
as in Equation 3.2. The game thus is strategically equivalent to a single all-pay
auction with complete information where the prize values are respectively V1 for
Player 1 and(1 − λ)V2 for Player 2.
In this setting two circumstances are possible: (1 − λ)V2 > V1 and (1 − λ)V2 ≤
V1. The results of Siegel (2009) apply and the equilibrium has the following
characteristics.
Proposition 3.1.2 If α > V2 and (1 − λ)V2 > V1 hold, a unique equilibrium
exists characterized by the following elements:
When he/she does not have the head start advantage, Player 1 randomizes

















The expected payoﬀ is p0
1 = 0
When he/she has the head start advantage, Player 1 bids zero with probability
1.
His/her payoﬀ is pα
1 = V1





The expected payoﬀ is p2 = (1 − λ)V2 − V1.
Proof. The proof comes directly from Lemma 3.4 and from the results of
Baye et al. (1996).
Consider now the case where (1 − λ)V2 ≤ V1.
Proposition 3.1.3 If α > V2 and (1 − λ)V2 ≤ V1 hold, a unique equilibrium
exists characterized by the following elements:
When he/she does not have the head start advantage, Player 1 randomizes







The expected payoﬀ is p0
1 = V1 − (1 − λ)V2
When he/she has the head start advantage, Player 1 bids zero with probability
1.
His/her payoﬀ is pα
1 = V1












if x2 = 0
if x2 > 0
￿
The expected payoﬀ is p2 = 0.
Proof. Analogous to that of Proposition 3.5.
If α is large, Player 1 wins with probability 1 and does not submit positive
bids when the head start advantage is awarded. Player 2’s probability to win thus
is scaled down by a factor 1 − λ and so is his/her reach.
Note that when (1 − λ)V2 ≤ V1 holds, uncertainty guarantees an information
rent to Player 1. When he/she has no advantage, the payoﬀ is p0
1 = V1−(1 − λ)V2
which is greater than V1 − V2 and zero, i.e. the payoﬀs that he/she would have
got in a complete information setting respectively if V1 ≥ V2 and V1 < V2.
Consider now what happens when Player 1 actively participates in the auction
if he/she has the head start advantage. A preliminary result is worth mentioning.
Lemma 3.1.4 If α ≤ V2 holds, no equilibrium strategies exist such that p0
1 > 0
and p2 > 0.




1 = 0 and x
¯
2 = 0 must hold. Note that p0
1 > 0 requires F2(0) > 0 since
V1 · F2(0) > 0 must hold when x0
1 = 0. The same argument can be used to show
that p2 > 0 requires F0
1 (0) > 0. A proﬁtable deviation thus exists since players’
probability of getting the item increases by a ﬁnite amount, if they bid slightly
more than 0.
In this setting two classes of equilibria emerge; one involves the active partici-
pation of Player 1 in both states of the world while the second is characterized by
the fact that Player 1 bids zero with probability 1 when he/she has not the head
start advantage. Consider the case where both players submit positive bids in all
the states of the world.
Proposition 3.1.5 If 1 ≥ V1
V2 ≥ λ and α ≤ V2 hold, an equilibrium characterized
by the following elements exists






































when he/she does not have the head start advantage.
The expected payoﬀ is p0
1 = 0
When he/she has the head start advantage Player 1 randomizes over the







The expected payoﬀ is pα
1 = α




The expected payoﬀ is p2 = V2 − V1.
Proof. See the Appendix
Note again that uncertainty guarantees an information rent to Player 1 whose
payoﬀ is nil if he/she has no advantage as in the corresponding complete informa-
tion setting but increases to α ≥ V1 − V2 + α in case he/she has the advantage.
Proposition 3.1.6 The equilibrium characterized above is unique.
Proof. Consider the case where λ ≤
V1
V2 holds. As proven in Proposition 3.8,
p0
1 = 0 must hold and Player 1 is indiﬀerent between bidding or not if he/she
has not the head start advantage. Assume now that Player 1 does not actively
participates in the auction. Player 2 competes with probability λ with an opponent
whose reach is V1 +α. Two circumstances are possible in this setting and namely
V2 ≥ V1 + α or V2 < V1 + α
Consider the latter case. The same argument used in the complete information
setting establishes the following equilibrium condition must hold:
V1 · F2(x
α
1 + α) − x
α










implying that Player 2’s distribution has an atom of probability in zero amounting
to 1− V2
V1. If this is the case though proﬁtable deviation exists and Player 1 submits
a bid x0
1 = ε > 0 with ε arbitrarily small to get a positive expected payoﬀ when
he/she has not the head start advantage. This excludes that if V2 ≤ V1+α holds,
in equilibrium Player 1 does not participate in the auction when no head start
advantage is awarded.
Consider now the case V2 ≥ V1 + α and assume again that Player 1 does not
actively participates in the auction if he/she has not the head start advantage.
Player 2 can choose to contend the prize to both types of Player 1 or just bid
x2 = ε with probability 1 where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. This allows to win
with certainty if the head start advantage is not awarded and gives a payoﬀ p2 =
(1 − λ)V2−ε. Contending the prize in both states of the world gives Player 2 the
payoﬀ p2 = V2 − V1 − α. This is easily proven using same argument presented in
the complete information setting.
Bidding x2 = ε is an optimal strategy only if (1 − λ)V2 ≥ V2 − V1 − α or
λ < V1+α
V2 holds. The previous condition is trivially satisﬁed since it is λ ≤ V1
V2 and
8thus Player 2 only contest the prize in the state of the world where the advantage
is not awarded. Player 1 though has the proﬁtable deviation to submit a bid
slightly bigger than ε when he/she has not the head start advantage, to get a
positive payoﬀ. This excludes that in equilibrium Player 1 does not participate
in the auction when no head start advantage is awarded. As a consequence when
it is 1 ≥ V1
V2 ≥ λ, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3.8 is unique.
Uniqueness follows from the argument used in the complete information setting
which establishes that player strategies in each state of the world are continuous
and that atoms of probability can be placed only in x0
1 = 0. In particular it
follows from the fact that x
¯
α
1 = 0 and ¯ xα
1 = V1 − α hold if Player 1 has the head
start advantage, while x
¯
0
1 = 0 and ¯ x0
1 = V1 hold otherwise.The same argument
establishes uniqueness with regard to Player 2 strategy.
Corollary 3.1.7 If 1 ≥ λ > V1
V2, α ≤ V2 and V2 < V1 + α hold, no equilibrium
for the game exists
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Proposition 3.9.
A second class of equilibria emerges when the probability that the head start
advantage is awarded is suﬃciently high and Player 2’s reach exceeds that of
his/her opponent.
Corollary 3.1.8 If 1 ≥ λ > V1
V2, α ≤ V2 and V2 ≥ V1 + α hold, a unique equi-
librium exists where Player 1 bids zero with probability 1 if he/she does not have
the head start advantage, and randomizes over the support [0,V1] according to the











His/her expected payoﬀ is pα
1 = 0.





His/her expected payoﬀ is p2 = V2 − V1 − α.
Proof. Note that Player 2 can always get a positive payoﬀ by bidding slightly
more than V1+α and this implies p2 > 0. The same argument used in Proposition
3.2 establishes that in equilibrium x
¯
α
1 = 0 and x
¯
2 = α must hold; this implies
further that in order to have p2 > 0, it must be Fα
1 (0) > 0. It is possible then
to exclude that an equilibrium exist where pα
1 > 0. If that were the case indeed
F2(α) > 0 must hold, implying that both players have the proﬁtable deviation to
9bid slightly more respectively than x
¯
α
1 = 0 and x
¯
2 = α since their probability of
winning increases discretely at these bids.
In equilibrium thus it is pα
1 = 0 implying that Player 1 is indiﬀerent between
actively participating in the auction or bid 0 with probability 1. The latter cir-
cumstance is never veriﬁed in equilibrium. If that were the case indeed, Player
2 optimal response entails bidding with probability 1, x2 = α + ε with ε > 0
arbitrarily small. A proﬁtable deviation thus exists for Player 1 when he/she has
the advantage because he/she can bid slightly more than xα
1 = ε to get a positive
expected payoﬀ.


















implying that Player 2 randomizes continuously over the support [α,V1 + α].
Given this distribution for Player 2’s bids, it is easy to verify that when the
head start advantage is not awarded, every bid in the set of Player 1’s undominated
actions gives a negative payoﬀ. Hence Player 1 never actively participates in the
auction.
Since the upper bound of Player 2’ distribution is V1 −α, it must be the case
that in equilibrium:
(1 − λ)V2 + λ · V2 · F
α






















implying that Player 1 randomizes over the support [0,V1] with an atom in zero
amounting to 1 − V1
λ·V2 > 0. Uniqueness is proven using the standard arguments.
Consider now the complementary case where V1 > V2 holds and both players
participate in the auction in all the states of the world.
Proposition 3.1.9 If V1
V2 > 1 ≥ λ and α ≤ V2 hold, a unique equilibrium charac-
terized by the following elements exists.


























when he/she does not have the head start advantage.
The expected payoﬀ is p0
1 = V1 − V2
When he/she has the head start advantage Player 1 randomizes over the







The expected payoﬀ is pα
1 = V1 − V2 + α
Player 2 randomizes over the support [0,V2] according to the following cumu-
lative distribution function:





The expected payoﬀ is p2 = 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this case the upper bound for players’ distributions remains unchanged
and coincides with the valuation of the prize by Player 2. As a consequence
there are no variations in player payoﬀs with respect to the complete information
setting. Player 2’s payoﬀ is equal to that obtained with complete information
when competing with an opponent with the head start advantage. If he/she
has no advantage Player 1’s payoﬀ is the same as in the corresponding complete
information setting.
3.2 Uncertainty over the Size of the Head-Start Advantage
Consider a setting where the size of the head start advantage is private infor-
mation of Player 1. Suppose for instance that an incumbent and a new entrant
are racing for the same patent and the latter is uncertain about the amount of
the incumbent’s previous R&D expenditures.
Player 2 faces n ≥ 2 types of Player 1, each characterized by a speciﬁc ad-
vantage αi (i = 1,2,...,n) with 0 ≤ α1 < α2... < αn. Let πi be the probability
that Player 1’s type is i. Assume initially that the head start advantage does not
exceed Player 2’s prize value and αn ≤ V2. Hence there are no states of the world
where Player 2’s reach is negative and he/she never wins.
Denote with F i
1 (xi
1) Player 1’s equilibrium strategy when his/her type is i.




































i=1πi · V2 · F
i
1 (x2 − αi) − x2 = p2.
The characterization of the equilibrium requires that Player 2’s reach be com-
pared with that of Player 1, type 1.
11Proposition 3.2.1 If V1 > V2 − α1, a unique equilibrium exists.
Player 1 bids 0 with probability 1 when his/her advantage is αj < αt where





πt < 1 holds. The expected payoﬀ
is p
j
1 = V1 − V2 + αt.
Consider a type i ≥ t. If i = t, Player 1 randomizes over the support


























if 0 < xt
1 < αt+1 − αt
￿
.
If i > t he/she randomizes continuously over the support (0,V2 − αi]; his /her
















In the interval αk − αi ≤ xi
























If αn − αi ≤ xi






























The expected payoﬀ is pi
1 = V1 − V2 + αi.









if x2 = 0
if x2 > αt
￿
.
The expected payoﬀ is p2 = 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that players’ payoﬀs and expendi-
tures are as in the complete information setting, no matter which type of Player
1 is considered. This is the case because the reach of Player 1, type 1, exceeds
that of Player 2. Introducing uncertainty over the size of the advantage thus does
not change the upper bound for players’ distributions which depends on Player
2’s prize value. Indeed, the ranking over players’ reaches is unchanged.
12A diﬀerent situation emerges if the reach of Player 1, type 1, is lower than
that of the opponent. In this case Player 1 obtains an information rent which
follows from a redeﬁnition in the ranking of the bidders’ reaches. A preliminary
result must be mentioned before characterizing the equilibria for the game.
Lemma 3.2.2 When V2−αt < V1 ≤ V2−α1 with t ≤ n, no equilibria exist where





V2 − αˆ  ≥ 0 holds.
Proof. No equilibria exist where Player 1, type 1, participates in the auction
and gets a positive payoﬀ. Suppose indeed that p1
1 > 0. The same argument
presented in Proposition 3.13 establishes that p2 = 0 and requires that Player 2’s
distribution has an upper bound ¯ x2 < V1 + α1. Since ¯ x1
1 = ¯ x2 − α1 holds1, the
condition V1 · F2(¯ x1
1 + α1) − ¯ x1
1 > 0 also holds. Every bid greater than ¯ x2 − αi is
thus a dominated action for Player 1, type i ≥ 1 and Player 2 has the proﬁtable
deviation to submit a bid in the interval (¯ x2,V2) and get a positive payoﬀ given
that ¯ x2 < V1 + α1 < V2 holds.
Hence p1
1 = 0 and Player 1, type 1, is indiﬀerent between participating in
the auction or not. Assume that he/she bids 0 with probability 1. The same
argument presented above establishes that p2
1 = 0 and p
j
1 = 0 with j < t hold if
Player 1 does not actively participate in the auction when his/her advantage is
strictly smaller than αj.






2 = αt hold and players’ expected payoﬀs are pi
1 > 0 and p2 = 02. This
requires that Player 2’s distribution has an atom of probability at some bid in the
interval [0,αt], so that F2(αt) > 0 holds. Player 2 places the atom in 0 unless




V2 − αˆ  ≥ 0. If the latter inequality holds,
he/she can indeed get a positive expected payoﬀ by bidding slightly more than
αˆ . This though provides Player 1, type ˆ , with the proﬁtable deviation to bid
x
ˆ 
1 = ε > 0 with ε arbitrarily small and get a positive payoﬀ. As a consequence,
no equilibria exist where all the types j < t do not participate in the auction while ￿￿ˆ 
l=1 πl
￿
V2 − αˆ  ≥ 0.




V2−αˆ  ≥ 0 holds
for some ˆ  < t, multiple equilibria exist. In particular there are t − ˆ t equilibria




V2 holds. Each of
them is characterized as follows.
Player 1 bids 0 with probability 1 and gets a nil payoﬀ if his/her advantage is
strictly smaller than αj with t > j > ˆ t.
1This is proven as in Proposition 3.2.
2This again is proven as in Proposition 3.2.
13Consider a type i ≥ j. If i = j, Player 1 randomizes over the support
[0,V1 − αi + αj]. The equilibrium cumulative distribution function on the interval




































if 0 < x
j





If i > j , he/she randomizes continuously over the support (0,V1 − αi + αj].
















In the interval αk−1 − αi ≤ xi
























If αn − αi ≤ x
i











1 − αn + αi


















The expected payoﬀ is pi
1 = αi − αj.





The expected payoﬀ is p2 = V2 − V1 − αj.
Proof. Lemma 3.14 establishes that in equilibrium there is at least one type
j < t of Player 1 who actively participates in the auction obtaining an expected
payoﬀ p
j
1 = 0. Therefore F2(V1 + αj) = 1 must hold and every bid greater than
V1 − αi + αj is a dominated action for a type i > j. As a consequence, no
equilibrium exists such that p2 = 0 since Player 2 can get a positive payoﬀ by
bidding slightly more than V1 + αj.
The same argument used in Proposition 3.2 establishes that ¯ x2 = V1 + αj,
¯ xi
1 = V1+αj −αi, x
¯
2 = αj and x
¯
i
1 = 0. Hence p2 = V2−V1−αj and the following

































































p=1 πp − V1
V2
￿
which can be placed only in 03. His/her active participa-








When this happens, for every bid x2 ∈
￿
αk,αk+1￿
with k ≥ j+1, the following


















































k+1 ≥ x2 ≥ α
k￿
− x2
= V2 − V1 − α
j




































1 (αk+1 − αi) − F i
















x2 − V1 − αj
V2
.
3This is proven as in Proposition 3.2.
15Following the same steps presented in Proposition 3.13 it is possible to characterize
the equilibrium cumulative distribution functions.
Consider now Player 1 and note that if his/her advantage is αj, he/she gets a
nil expected payoﬀ since ¯ x
j










or exploiting the equivalence x
j






1 = V1 + αj − αi, Player 1’s expected payoﬀ if his/her advantage is
αi > αt, is pi












holds such that once again F2(x2) = x2−αj
V1 .
Given Player 2’s equilibrium strategy, Player 1 gets a negative payoﬀ sub-
mitting a strictly positive bid when his/her advantage is strictly smaller than αj.
This excludes that a proﬁtable deviation exists.




V2 − αˆ  ≥ 0 holds for
some ˆ  < t, no equilibrium exists when 1 −
￿t−1
p=1 πp < V1
V2.
Proof. This follows straightforwardly from Proposition 3.15.
Uncertainty reduces players expenditures. In particular, auctioneer’s expected
revenues are as if there were perfect information and Player 1’s head start advan-
tage were αj. This circumstance guarantees an information rent to Player 1.
Indeed, his/her payoﬀ is nil when the advantage is αj as in the complete informa-
tion setting but increases to αi − αj ≥ V1 − V2 + αi if i > j. Player 1 "mimics"
the behavior of the type with the lowest reach which participates in the auction
to reduce expected expenditures and increase his/her expected payoﬀ. In fact,











− x2 = V2 − V1 − α
j.
This result could be interpreted as a reverse of the "exclusion principle"4
which states that a selection among the players increases the auctioneer’s revenues
by increasing competition. Uncertainty widening the set of (potential) players
reduces competition. Compare indeed the case of complete information where
4See Baye et al. (1993)
16Player 2 faces an opponent with a head start advantage αi with the incomplete
information setting. Now the potential competitors are n and their reaches are
distributed over a range where at least one element is smaller than or equal to
V1 + αi. This reduces competition because it allows for the circumstance where
Player 2 faces an opponent who is "weaker" than type i.
A last circumstance must be considered.




V2 − αj < 0 for every
type j < t, two classes of equilibria emerge.
A ﬁrst class includes equilibria where every type j < t does not actively partic-
ipate in the auction. The equilibrium strategies for Player 2 and for all the types
i ≥ t are the same as for the case where Player 1’s advantage is always greater
than or equal to αt.
A second class includes equilibria where some type j < t actively participates
in the auction while lower types bid 0 with probability 1. The equilibrium strategies
for Player 2 and for all the types i ≥ j are the same as for the case where Player
1’s advantage is always greater than or equal to αj.
Proof. Consider the ﬁrst type of equilibrium and assume that no type j < t
actively participates in the auction. Then p2 = 0 and pt
1 > 0 must hold implying
that F2(αt) > 0. Player 2’s equilibrium distribution has an atom of probability




V2 − αj < 0 holds for every
type j < t, an optimal strategy requires the atom to be placed in 0.
Player 2 in fact competes only with types i > t; hence, the equilibrium for
the game is qualitatively analogous to that arising when Player 1’ advantage is
always greater or equal to αt which is characterized in Proposition 3.13.
Consider now what happens when a type j < t actively participates in the
auction. Following the argument presented in Proposition 3.15 it is possible to
show that t − 1 equilibria emerge where Player 1 submits positive bids only if
his/her advantage is bigger than αj.
Consider now what happens if the hypothesis αn ≤ V2 is dropped. A ﬁrst
preliminary result is worth noting.
Proposition 3.2.6 When αn ≥ V2 holds, Player 2 actively participates in the




Proof. If αn ≥ V2, there must be at least a type j of Player 1 such that for
every i > j the inequality αi ≥ V2 holds. Since every bid x2 > V2 is a dominated
action, Player 2 with probability
￿n
l=j πl submits a bid which never wins. Player













< αj holds. If this is the case Player 2’s reach
17is further scaled down by a factor πj · V2. The set of undominated actions must






−πj · V2 and αj−1. Player 2 thus
submits strictly positive bids only if there is at least a type t ≤ j of Player 1
whose head start advantage does not exceed his/her reach. This requires that
αt − αt−1 ≥ V2 · πt holds or equivalently αt ≥ V2(1 −
￿n
i=t πi) ≥ αt−1.
Corollary 3.2.7 If there is a type t < n such that αt ≥ V2(1 −
￿n
l=t πt) ≥ αt−1,
the game is strategically equivalent to an auction where prize values are V1 and
V2(1 −
￿n
i=t πi) and Player 1’s head start advantage is smaller than or equal to
αt−1.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from Proposition 3.18.
Corollary 3.2.8 If no type t exists such that αt ≥ V2(1 −
￿n
i=t πi) ≥ αt−1 holds,
in the unique equilibrium of the game Player 1 and Player 2 bid 0 with probability
1 and get a payoﬀ respectively of pi
1 = V1 and p2 = 0.
Proof. The proof descends straightforwardly from Proposition 3.18.
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FINAL REMARKS
The paper provides a brief analysis of the game where two players with diﬀerent
"bidding technologies" compete in a ﬁrst-price all-pay auction. Indeed there is a
favored player who has a head start advantage whose size is exogenously given.
This setting ﬁts many contests where one player has an incumbency advantage
which depends on the auctioneer’s preferences. The head start advantage captures,
for instance, the bias toward a briber of a corrupt oﬃcial motivated by trust
deriving from previous involvement in the same business. In elections, it deﬁnes
the initial preference which some or all voters may have for a speciﬁc candidate
due to ideology or personal charisma, regardless of electoral platforms. Finally,
an asymmetry between players may stem from the decision of the legislator to
promote speciﬁc principles as in the case of criminal law where the counsel for the
defense starts ahead of the prosecution. The circumstances listed above are fairly
common in the economic literature and at least for the ﬁrst two examples, it is
plausible that the size of the incumbent’s head start advantage is uncertain.
The main eﬀect of uncertainty is to reduce bidders’ expected expenditures and
hence the revenues collected by the auctioneer. In particular, this happens if there
is at least one type of Player 1 whose reach is smaller than that of Player 2. This
circumstance also deﬁnes an information rent for the favored player. If revenue
maximization is the aim of the contest, as is the case in rent-seeking activities,
then the auctioneer should try to reduce uncertainty. Analogously in patent races
a reduction in R&D investments of both the incumbent ﬁrm and the new entrant
occurs, slowing down the pace of innovation.
In the present setting uncertainty is limited to the size of the head start
advantage. However, in some real world circumstances the prize value is also
private information of the players. Studying uncertainty on both these dimensions
could represent a valuable extension to the present paper. Finally many contests
involve more than one player. The introduction of multiple bidders could be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX: MAIN PROOFS
5.1 Proof of Proposition 2.0.2
Successive rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies restrict play-
ers’ bids to the interval [0,V2 − α] for Player 1 and to [α,V2] ∪ {0} for Player 2.
Every strictly positive bid smaller than α is strictly dominated by x2 = 0; any
such oﬀer has a nil probability of winning and gives a negative payoﬀ. Moreover,
Player 2 never bids more than his/her own prize value because again this gives
a negative payoﬀ; x2 = 0 strictly dominates x2 > V2. Since Player 2 never bids
more than V2, Player 1 wins with certainty by oﬀering x1 ≥ V2 − α. However,
x1 = V2 −α strictly dominates every greater bid; Player 1 wins in both cases but
in the latter his/her payment is smaller and the payoﬀ higher.
Following Hillman and Riley (1989) (see also Baye et al. (1993), Che and
Gale (1998) and Ellingsen (1991)) it is possible to exclude that Player 1 submits
a bid, κ ∈ (0,V2 − α], with strictly positive probability. If this happens, Player
2’s probability of winning rises discontinuously at x2 = κ and there is some ε > 0
such that Player 2 bids on the interval [κ − ε,κ] with nil probability. Player 1
thus is better oﬀ shifting the mass of probability down from κ to κ − ε to reduce
his/her spending level without aﬀecting the probability of winning. A symmetrical
argument applies to Player 2’s strategies on the interval (α,V2].
A strictly positive probability can only be attached to x1 = 0, x2 = α or to
x2 = 0. However, it cannot be the case that Player 1 places an atom of prob-
ability in 0 and that, at the same time, Player 2’s distribution has an atom of
probability in α. If this happens, Player 1 increases the probability of winning by
a ﬁnite amount, by bidding slightly more than 0. Player 2 can do the same by
bidding slightly more than α, and a proﬁtable deviation exists for both players.
Analogously in equilibrium it cannot happen that F1(0) > 0 and Player 2 ran-
domizes over a support which includes x2 = α. Since ties are broken randomly,
his/her probability of winning decreases discontinuously at α and a proﬁtable de-
viation exists, i.e. to shift probability to x2 > α. The same argument excludes
that x1 = 0 is submitted with positive probability if Player 2’s distribution has
an atom of probability in α. Given that players’ strategies are continuous over
(0,V2 − α] and (α,V2], the probability of a tie is nil.
Let ¯ xi be the upper bound for the support of Player i’s distribution. In
equilibrium the equality ¯ x1 = ¯ x2 − α holds. Suppose instead that ¯ x1 > ¯ x2 − α.
When x1 = ¯ x1, Player 1 gets the auctioned item with probability 1; every bid such
that ¯ x2 −α < x1 < ¯ x1 has the same probability of winning but involves a smaller
20payment and strictly dominates ¯ x1. A symmetrical argument applied to Player 2
excludes that ¯ x1 < ¯ x2 − α holds.
Let x
¯









2 − α. Any bid such that
x
¯
1 ≤ x1 < x
¯
2−α gives Player 1 a nil probability of winning and a negative payoﬀ.





a symmetrical argument excludes that this inequality is veriﬁed.
Note now that x
¯
1 = 0 and x
¯
2 = α must hold. Indeed, if x
¯
1 > 0, Player 1 can
reduce his/her spending level by shifting down the lower bound of the distribution.








Player 1’s expected payoﬀ, p1, is:
E [U1(x1,F2(α + x1))] =
(V1 − x1)F2(α + x1) − x1[1 − F2(α + x1)] = p1.
Player 2’s expected payoﬀ, p2, is:
E [U2(x2,F1(x2 − α))] =
(V2 − x2)F1(x2 − α) − x2[1 − F1(x2 − α)] = p2.
In equilibrium, the players obtain the same expected payoﬀ from each pure
strategy over which they randomize. Since Player 2 never bids more than V2 and
V2 ≤ V1 + α holds, Player 1 can always secure a positive payoﬀ oﬀering x1 ≥ V2.
If in equilibrium p1 > 0, then F2(α) > 0 when x
¯
1 = 0 holds. Moreover, Player
2’s expected payoﬀ must be nil. Suppose that this is not the case; p2 > 0 requires
that when x2 = α, F1(0) > 0 holds. However, the inequality F2(α) > 0 must be
veriﬁed as well, implying that the atom in Player 2’s distribution is placed at 0 as
proven above. Since x2 = 0 always gives a nil payoﬀ, p2 > 0 cannot hold.
Player 2 is indiﬀerent between actively participating in the auction and bidding
0 with probability 1. The latter circumstance though never occurs in equilibrium.
If this were the case, Player 1’s optimal response would be to bid 0 with certainty
implying that Player 2 has the proﬁtable deviation to bid x2 = α + ε with ε > 0
arbitrarily small.
Since p2 = 0, in equilibrium ¯ x1 = V2 − α and ¯ x2 = ¯ x1 + α = V2 must hold.
If this were not the case and ¯ x2 < V2, one would also obtain ¯ x1 < V2 − α and
Player 2 would have the proﬁtable deviation to bid slightly more than ¯ x2 to get a
positive payoﬀ.
The equilibrium conditions may now be deﬁned. The following equality must
hold for Player 2:
(V2 − x2)F1(x2 − α) − x2[1 − F1(x2 − α)] = 0
21so that F1(x2 − α) = x2−α
V2 + α





Since no negative bids are allowed, Player 1’s equilibrium distribution has an
atom in 0 amounting to α
V2; hence he/she bids 0 with probability α
V2 and with
complementary probability randomizes according to a uniform distribution over
the interval (0,V2 − α].
Bidding x1 = V2−α gives Player 1 an expected payoﬀ amounting to V1+α−
V2 > 0; in equilibrium then the condition:
(V1 − x1)F2(x1 + α) − x1 [1 − F2(x1 + α)] = V1 + α − V2
holds, or F2(x1 + α) = 1 − V2
V1 + x1+α
V1 such that also









2 = α, the previous distribution has an atom of probability.
Since F1(0) > 0 holds, the atom must be placed in 0. Player 2 thus bids 0
with probability 1 −
V2
V1 + α
V1 ≥ 0 and randomizes according to the cumulative
distribution function x2
V1 over the support (α,V2] with complementary probability.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the continuity of players’ strategies
and from the deﬁnition of the upper and lower bounds of the supports. Since no
atoms of probability can be placed at any bid x1 > 0, only the proposed strategies
satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1.5
Note initially that p0
1 = 0 must hold. Suppose this is not the case. If it
were p0
1 > 0, by Lemma 3.7 it should be also p2 = 0 and F2(0) > 0. Player
2’s distribution would have an upper bound ¯ x2 < V1 and the following inequality
would hold for x0










Every bid greater than x0
1 and greater than xα
1 = ¯ x2 − α is a dominated
action for Player 1 respectively if he/she has not and if he/she has the head start
advantage. Hence Player 2 has the proﬁtable deviation to submit a bid x2 such
that ¯ x2 < x2 < V2 and get a positive payoﬀ since ¯ x2 < V1 < V2. This excludes
that an equilibrium where p0
1 > 0 and p2 = 0 exists.
If p0
1 = 0, Player 1 is indiﬀerent between actively participating in the auction
or bidding zero with probability 1 when he/she does not have the head start
advantage. Assume that he/she actively participates in the auction. This requires
that in equilibrium, for x0
1 = V1 the equality V1 · F2(V1) = V1 holds, implying
22that F2(V1) = 1. Every bid greater than V1 − α thus is a dominated action
for Player 1 if he/she has the advantage. As a consequence it is possible to
exclude that an equilibrium exists where p2 = 0. Player 2 indeed can obtain a
certain positive payoﬀ by bidding slightly more than x2 = V1. Since it is ¯ x2 = V1
the same argument used in Proposition 3.2 establishes that ¯ x0
1 = ¯ x2 = V1 and
¯ xα








1 = 0; as a consequence it is
p2 = V2 − V1 and the following equality must be veriﬁed for every x2 ∈ [0,α):
(1 − λ)V2 · F
0



















































Consider now the equilibrium conditions for x2 ∈ [α,V1]. It must be the case
that the following equality holds:
V2(1 − λ)F
0
1 (α) + V2
￿




λ · Pr[x2 − α > x
α
1|x2 ≥ α] +
+V2
￿











= V2 − V1
From the previous equilibrium condition it is F 0


























λ · Pr[x2 − α > x
α
















= V2 − V1
Simplifying and reordering the terms gives:
λ · Pr[x2 − α > x
α










Pr[x2 − α > x
α













Using the same argument presented in Proposition 3.2 it is possible to show








1 = 0 holds, implying that Fα
1 (0) = 0. As a
consequence since
Pr[x2 − α > x
α
1|x2 > α] =
Fα
1 (x2 − α) − F α
1 (0)




1 (x2 − α)
hold, it is also
F
α












































































(1 − λ)(V1 − α)
Consider now Player 1. When he/she does not have the head start advantage















If he/she has the advantage the equality ¯ xα
1 = ¯ x2 − α implies that pα
1 = α.
The following condition thus must be veriﬁed for every xα
1 ∈ [0,V1 − α]
V1 · F2(x
α
1 + α) − x
α
1 = α
24which is equivalent to:
F2(x
α




implying that again is F2(x2) = x2
V1.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1.9
If V1 > V2 holds, it is possible to exclude that p0
1 = 0, since Player 1 can
always obtain a certain positive payoﬀ by bidding slightly more than x0
1 = V2.
By Lemma 3.7, p2 = 0 must hold. Player 2 thus is indiﬀerent between actively
participate in the auction and bid zero with probability 1. Note though that no
equilibria exist such that F2(0) = 1 holds. If this happens indeed, a best response
for Player 1 is to bid x1
1 = ε with ε > 0 arbitrarily small and xα
1 = 0 to win the
prize with certainty in both the states of the world. This implies that Player 2 has
the proﬁtable deviation to bid slightly more than α to get a certain positive payoﬀ.
As a consequence it must be the case that for x2 = V2 the equality V2·F1(V2) = V2
holds implying F1(V2) = 1. Every bid greater than V2 and than V2 − α thus is a
dominated action for Player 1 respectively if he/she has not and if he/she has the
head start advantage. Since it is ¯ x2 = V2 the same argument used in Proposition
3.2 establishes that ¯ x0
1 = ¯ x2 = V2 and ¯ xα









1 = 0; as a consequence it is p2 = 0 and the following equality must be
veriﬁed for every x2 ∈ [0,α):
(1 − λ)V2 · F
0





























V2 · λ · Pr[x2 − α > x
α
1|x2 ≥ α] +
+V2
￿










− x2 = 0
From the previous equilibrium condition it is F 0
1 (α) = α
(1−λ)V2. Substituting







λ · Pr[x2 − α > x
α













− x2 = 0
25Note now that is:
Pr[x2 − α > x
α
1|x2 ≥ α] =
Fα























































− x2 = 0
Simplifying and reordering the terms gives:
λ · F
α
1 (x2 − α) + (1 − λ)
F0






































1 − λ − α
V2
￿
(1 − λ)(V2 − α)
+
λ · α
(1 − λ)(V2 − α)
Uniqueness is proven as in Corollary 3.10.
Consider now Player 1. Since it is ¯ x0
1 = ¯ x2, p0
1 = V1 − V2 holds and the
































If he/she has the advantage instead the equality ¯ xα
1 = ¯ x2 − α implies that
pα
1 = V1−V2+α. The following condition thus must hold for every xα
1 ∈ [0,V2 − α]
V1 · F2(x
α
1 + α) − x
α
1 = V1 − V2 + α
which is equivalent to:
F2(x
α







implying that again is F2(x2) = 1 − V2
V1 + x2
V1.
Uniqueness is proven using the standard argument.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2.1
If V1 + α1 > V2, it may be excluded that in equilibrium p1
1 = 0 holds, since
Player 1 always obtains a positive payoﬀ by bidding slightly more than V2 − α1.
As a consequence, Player 2 must get a nil expected payoﬀ. Suppose instead that
p1
1 > 0 and p2 > 0 hold. The same argument used in Proposition 3.2 establishes
that, in equilibrium, we have x
¯
1
1 = 0 and x
¯
2 = α1. But p1
1 > 0 requires F2(α1) > 0
since V1 · F2(α1) > 0 must hold when x1
1 = 0. Analogously p2 > 0 requires
F1
1 (0) > 0 and the atom of probability in Player 2’s equilibrium distribution must
be placed at 0. This gives a nil expected payoﬀ and excludes that p2 > 0 holds.
Therefore Player 2 is indiﬀerent between actively participating in the auction
or bidding 0 with probability 1. But no equilibria exist such that F2(0) = 1. If
this happens, a best response for Player 1 is to bid xi
1 = 0 and get the prize with
certainty. Player 2 then has the proﬁtable deviation to bid slightly more than αn
and get a positive payoﬀ.
Since p2 = 0, when x2 = V2, the equality Σn
i=1πi · F i
1 (V2 − αi) = 1 must hold
and every bid greater than V2−αi is a dominated action for Player 1, type i. The
same argument used in Proposition 3.2 establishes further that ¯ xi
1 = V2 − αi and
¯ x2 = V2 hold.
In equilibrium the following condition must be veriﬁed for every x2 ∈ [α1,α2]:






− x2 = 0.
Through simple algebra, exploiting the equivalence x1















This deﬁnes the equilibrium cumulative distribution function of Player 1, type 1,
when 0 ≤ x1
1 < α2 − α1. It has an atom of probability which by the argument
27presented in Proposition 3.2 can only be placed in 0; as a consequence, in order
to have Player 1 actually participating in the auction α1
π1·V2 ≤ 1 must hold. If this
is not the case, Player 2 never bids in the interval (α1,α2] because this gives a
negative expected payoﬀ.
Consider the case where Player 1 does not actively participate in the auction
when his/her advantage is strictly smaller than αt. The same argument presented











− x2 = 0



















when 0 ≤ xt
1 < αt+1 −αt. Also in this case Player 1’s distribution has an atom of










For every bid x2 ∈
￿
αk,αk+1￿














































k+1 ≥ x2 ≥ α
k￿

















1 (αk+1 − αi) − Fi
1 (αk − αi)




































1 (αk+1 − αi) − F i





















































Substitute intothe previous expression and exploit the equivalence xi
1+αi = x2














1 (αk+1 − αi) − F i




αk+1 − αk (5.2)
implying that:
Fi





1 (αk+1 − αi) − F i
1 (αk − αi)
=
x2 − αk
αk+1 − αk. (5.3)
Suppose that this were not the case and assume without loss of generality that







αk+1−αk. Then in order for






















1(αk−αi) < 1 holds, implying that F
j
1 (x2 − αj) must have an atom
of probability at αk+1 − αj. This can never be an equilibrium though, because
a proﬁtable deviation for Player 2 exists. Indeed, if Player 1 places an atom at
αk+1 − αj the probability of a tie is strictly positive. Since ties are broken ran-
domly, Player 2’s probability of winning decreases discontinuously at x2 = αk+1
and he/she has the proﬁtable deviation to shift probability to bids x2 > αk+1.
From Equation 3.6, since atoms of probability can be placed only at xt
1 = 01
and F k








1 (αk+1 − αk)
=
x2 − αk
αk+1 − αk. (5.4)
Divide now Equation 3.4 by
￿k






































1This is proven as in Proposition 3.2.
29Note that if the probability that x2 − αi is bigger than xi
1, conditional on x2 ∈ ￿
αk,αk+1￿
, is the same for all types of Player 1, then also F i


















































































































































































1) − F i
1 (αn − αi)
1 − Fi
1 (αn − αi)
￿
− x2 = 0.
30Substituting
￿n
i=1 πi · Fi
1 (αn − αi) = αn








1) − F i
1 (αn − αi)
1 − F i
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1 (αn − αi)
1 − F i











p=1 πp to get
F i















































Consider now Player 1. Since ¯ xi
1 = V2 − αi holds, it must be the case that
pi









1 = V1 − V2 + α
i
















1 + αi = x2, then also







The equilibrium condition x
¯
t
1 + αt = x
¯
2 = αt requires that Player 2’s distri-
bution has an atom in 0 amounting to 1 − V2
V1 + αt
V1 implying that not bidding in
the auction is in fact an optimal strategy for Player 1 when his/her type is j < t.
Indeed, the expected payoﬀ V1 − V2 + αt is greater than V1 − V2 + αj which is
obtained submitting a bid x
j
1 ∈ (αt,V2 − αj].
The argument presented in Proposition 3.2 excludes discontinuity in the ex-
pected joint distribution function deriving from Player 1’s equilibrium strategy
31and establishes that atoms of probability are placed only at xt




1 = 0 and ¯ xi
1 = V2−αi hold for Player 1 while x
¯
2 = αt and ¯ x1 = V2 hold for
Player 2. Analogously also Player 2’s distribution must be continuous for every
bid x2 > 0. Uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from the continuity of players’
strategies and from the deﬁnition of the upper and lower bounds of the supports.
Hence only the proposed strategies satisfy the equilibrium conditions.
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